On 26 November 2024, the Australian Institute of International Affairs NSW hosted Dr Alexey Muraviev, Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies at Curtin University. Dr Muraviev drew on his extensive academic experience of
studying Russia’s strategic and defence policy to offer expert analysis of the uncertain strategic circumstances the Baltic countries face, potential motivations for a Russian invasion of the region, and how Russia may choose to do this.

Dr Muraviev linked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to previous Russian hypothetical scenarios for attacks in the Baltic. These had predicted quick success for the Russian military. The Ukraine war had tested Russia’s real-life capacity to follow through on its elaborate claimed justifications for an invasion by achieving a decisive military victory. Prior to the war, even US think-tanks had assessed that Russia had the military superiority to carry out such an operation and that Kiev would fall within three weeks. Almost no one had expected that Ukraine could sustain its war-effort until now – 1005 days at the time of the address.

In the Baltics, Dr Muraviev saw several potential ‘triggers’ that could see Russia escalate current tensions into a war. He underscored the geo-strategic reality of the Baltics as a maritime region that has been at the centre of strategic competition
among great powers since the 12 th century. The region is geographically small, meaning the space for geo-political manoeuvrability, or hedging, is very limited. The region has been walking on a knife’s edge for a long time.

Dr Muraviev noted that Moscow appeared relatively unconcerned by the Baltic countries having become members of the NATO alliance. However, Russia’s strategic class may use the Baltics’ NATO membership as a justification for escalation. The Baltic region has seen an expansion of NATO infrastructure and troop rotations in recent years which could be framed as alarming in Moscow. Territorial disputes, particularly with Estonia, are another pressure point that could see Russia resort to using force to resolve the issue. Similarly, Russia would be quick to respond to any action against Kalingrad, its small Baltic enclave (or more
correctly ‘esclave’, since it is geographically separated from Russia).

Even as the war in Ukraine drags on, Dr Muraviev observed that the Russian military still has substantial reserve capacity, heightening the sense of insecurity in the Baltic countries. Supporting this, he noted that the bulk of the Russian navy remains ‘dormant’, much of the air-force remains unused, and Russian troops currently deployed in other countries could be re-assigned.

Dr Muraviev then explored the most likely strategies of a Russian invasion. In one scenario Russia would use the Suwalki Gap, a sparsely populated area along the border between Lithuania and Poland which potentially links Russia’s Kalingrad
esclave with Russia’s close ally and neighbour, Belarus. A Russian invasion using this region would cut the Baltics off from their primary NATO land supply lines. But Dr Muraviev said that the more likely scenario is that a Russian invasion would come
from the Gulf of Finland. There are historical precedents in both 1918 and 1939 which weigh heavily in the minds of Moscow’s strategic class.

Dr Muraviev concluded on the optimistic note that the scenarios he described are avoidable. None of the countries involved want the catastrophe of a Europe-Russia war. On the other hand, he does not see any examples of political leaders, on either
side, with either the courage or the will to take the steps necessary to provide the required reassurance.

Dr Muraviev then responded to questions from the audience. He was asked about the hypothetical, but still possible, scenario that would see President Trump make a deal with Putin to end the war in Ukraine in which Russia retains the territory it
currently holds while the Kiev-controlled remainder of Ukraine gets security guarantees including accession to NATO. Dr Muraviev thought that an arrangement of this kind could be achieved and that all parties involved could find genuine
security. He was uneasy, however, about whether this was possible.

The next question sought Dr Muraviev’s views on whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was motivated by Russian insecurity brought on by NATO expansion increasingly close to Russia’s borders. He responded that, while NATO expansion is a real concern for Moscow, it is not the only factor. Russian elites have always seen Ukraine as part of the Russian nation. The disbelief they felt as Ukraine drifted toward Europe was crystalised, he said, when Ukrainian troops fought against Russia in 2008 in Georgia. Ultimately, Dr Muraviev assesses that the war is a product of tension that has built up over decades.

Asked whether Lithuania’s unequivocal support for Taiwan might prompt China to welcome Russian aggression in the Baltics, Dr Muraviev commented that China has always sought investment opportunities in the Baltics and predicted that it will
continue to invest in infrastructure projects in which it sees strategic benefit for China, naming seaports as an example. He then expressed bewilderment at the strategy Lithuania is pursuing: it is ‘poking the bear’ without having the capacity or
willingness to ‘take up the fight’ if it comes. Rather, he said, they will rely on others to do the fighting.

Dr Muraviev then fielded a question on the slow-moving front lines seen in eastern Ukraine. He attributed this to both militaries being born out of the same Soviet tradition, both very aware of the other’s strategic and tactical thinking.

Asked why NATO countries and Russia are escalating the conflict now, he said that Putin is seeking to be taken seriously. The reason Putin has recently used inter-regional ballistic missiles, and updated Russia’s nuclear doctrine to permit these
weapons to be used on Ukraine, is that he wants to demonstrate his willingness to escalate in order to protect the advantage Russia has gained in the war.

A final questioner suggested that several advisors in Putin’s inner circle – ‘the hawks’– believe Ukraine is essential, while the Baltics are not within the scope of Russia’s territorial ambitions. Dr Muraviev did not agree that ‘the hawks’ in Russia limited their objectives only to Ukraine. They want to communicate the message that Russia remains a great power and its interests should be respected. He acknowledged that Russia’s resources are very much directed to the Ukraine war as of now, but
suggested that this is only because they are facing trouble. If they had been able to take Ukraine swiftly, as planned, these resources would by now be focussed elsewhere.

Report by Ethan Pooley,

AIIA NSW intern

Dr Alexey Muraviev (centre) with Ethan Pooley (left) and Ian Lincoln AIIA NSW President (right)