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How and when the war on Ukraine can end

Published 07 Oct 2024

On 1 October the Australian Institute of International Affairs NSW hosted H.E. Mr Vasyl Myroshnychenko, the Ukrainian ambassador to Australia and New Zealand, for an address and Q and A session that covered several aspects of Russia’s
invasion of his country. The event occurred as the war in Ukraine approaches the two and a half year mark. With Russia making continuing advances in eastern Ukraine, and with Ukraine recently venturing into Russian territory for the first
time since the war’s outbreak, an end to the conflict does not appear to be in sight.

Ambassador Myroshnychenko began by contextualising the current war with an overview of the Ukrainian nation’s modern history from the early twentieth century to 2014 – the beginning of Russia’s quasi-war in Ukraine. This timeline began with Ukraine gaining independence following the chaos of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the fall of the Tsar. Four years later, in 1921, the Red Army’s defeat of Ukrainian forces led to Ukraine becoming a republic in the Soviet Union. Myroshnychenko described how Soviet rule brought about the destruction of Ukrainian nationhood. He described the horror of the Great Terror for Ukraine in 1937 which further rattled the social fabric of Ukraine and consolidated Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s political power. Myroshnychenko underscored the suffering of Ukrainians during the Second World War: it was sometimes forgotten that eight million Ukrainians died during this time.

Fast forwarding to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainians were given a vote to decide whether to separate or remain in the Russian Federation. Over 90% voted in favour of independence, and Ukraine was once again recognised as a sovereign state. But by 2013 Ukrainians felt that their government was not serving their interests, eventually leading to the Maidan Uprising in light of then president Yanukovych’s decision to not sign an agreement for closer ties with the European Union. Russia took advantage of this ‘Revolution of Dignity’ and in 2014 illegally took control of the Crimean Peninsula and embarked on its military campaign in eastern Ukraine – Myroshnychenko saw this as the true beginning of Russia’s invasion.

Myroshnychenko commented that the full-scale war beginning on 24 February 2022 had for him, and all Ukrainians, been a confronting and challenging experience. He likened their social media feeds to a never-ending obituary and a constant reminder of the tragedy families had to deal with. His government had documented war crimes committed by Russia; in particular Myroshnychenko highlighted the attacks on civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, education facilities and energy production – half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity has been cut off.

Myroshnychenko described the atrocities committed in Bucha, an outlying town of Kyiv, where his government found a trail of mass murder left behind by Russian forces. He remarked that the disproportionate Russian response was probably
provoked by the unexpected and determined resistance of the locals. He also told the story of his personal friends from Bucha who had, just a week before the attack, taken their family on a trip only to return to find their pet dog killed and their home trashed.

The impact on society was another feature of Myroshnychenko’s telling of the war. He told the audience that access to school for children is very limited as not every school has a bomb shelter, and those that do cannot accommodate every student.
There has been $155 billion in damages to infrastructure. Some 300,000 people have sustained injuries. Moreover, 30% of Ukraine’s territory has been mined which, with current resources, would take 750 years to clear.

Myroshnychenko then outlined what he identified as the key Russian narratives relating to the war. They included their claims that the war itself does not exist, that the West started the war, that Ukraine is an evil Nazi state and that Russia intervened to protect its own people. He dismissed all of these as propaganda.

The Q and A session covered many topics relating to Myroshnychenko’s experience as ambassador, the war and the broader geo-politics at play. One audience member commented that Myroshnychenko had begun his posting to Australia, and his diplomatic career, in March of 2022 – one month after the outbreak of the full scale war – and asked him to reflect on his experience as a ‘war-time ambassador’. He noted the challenge this has presented and said there is no playbook for such a role. He thinks, however, that his experience in Australia has been productive. On this point, Myroshnychenko distinguished between his experience in Australia and that of his colleagues in South-East Asia, saying that he has gained much greater access to decision makers and media, which he attributed to the high rates of support Australians have for Ukraine.

Another questioner commented on the apparent willingness of Ukraine to engage in negotiations to reach a deal at the beginning of the war and was interested in whether this option is still on the cards. Myroshnychenko responded that he does
not see it as worthwhile to have talks to end the war as Moscow has, over time, demonstrated its disregard for agreements: there is no longer trust that the terms of a bargain reached at this time can be sustainable. Compromise would amount to
Ukrainian capitulation.

In similar terms, he dismissed an audience member’s suggestion that Russia’s invasion might have been deterred if the 2014-15 Minsk agreements (which sought to end the Donbas war between armed Ukrainian Russian separatist groups and the armed forces of Ukraine) could have been implemented: he said that Russia had never meant to comply.

Asked about the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory in early August, he said its purpose was to change the dynamics of the war. Asked about reports that Australian-supplied bushmaster armoured vehicles had been used by Ukraine in this incursion and whether Myroshnychenko had sought permission from (or had advised) the Australian government of the use of its equipment in such an operation, he responded that Ukrainians appreciate the support provided by the Australian government and recounted a story shared with him that the bushmasters have saved lives on the battlefield. He said that all actions carried out by Ukrainian forces in the war, including the campaign in Russia’s Kursk region, are carried out
according to international and humanitarian law.

Another questioner asked whether the upcoming presidential election in the US, could bring in an administration that is less supportive of Ukraine. Myroshnychenko responded that he remains confident that any administration will provide the support needed – in particular citing America’s support for Ukraine under the former Trump administration. He saw it as being in US interests for Ukraine to prevail.

Asked for his assessment of how secure Putin’s leadership is, he said that Putin’s Russia is a house of cards and that Putin is being weakened domestically by the ongoing war, but that he only sees the leadership changing hands once Putin dies.

 

Report by Ethan Pooley, AIIA NSW intern

 

H.E. Mr Vasyl Myroshnychenko (centre), Ethan Pooley, AIIA NSW intern (left) and

Ian Lincoln, AIIA NSW president (right)