This article analyses the initial post-independence UK-Pakistan relationship through a decolonial lens and makes comparisons with recent developments. The importance of this approach is the contextualisation of this relationship within colonialism, but also how steps have been and continue to be taken by both countries towards and away from decolonisation. 

UK-Pakistan relations began with Pakistan’s independence on 14 August 1947, but because it is defined by the dynamics between the British colonial administration in pre-Partition India and the indigenous people, it will be viewed here through a decolonial lens. Decolonisation is understood as the formal process of freedom from a colonial power, the dismantling of British colonial influence over and colonial legacies in Pakistan and the deconstruction of the ideas that underpinned the colonial project. Each section will address one manifestation of decolonisation, but also regressions away from decolonisation.  3

Reduction in Pakistan’s Reliance on the UK 

Indians lacked self-determination under the British colonial administration in pre-Partition India, insofar as the Executive Council was responsible for governance and was led by the British governor-general pre-1858 and the viceroy post-1858. One component of decolonisation is thus control over the finances of the country by indigenous representatives and a reduction in reliance on the UK. 

After independence, Pakistan began to diversify its trade relationships. When considering the future of British trade within the Commonwealth in November 1952, a House of Lords peer cited a statement made by Pakistan that it no longer intended to have an “Imperial Preference” in terms of its trading relations with the UK. It had been acknowledged that Pakistan had turned to Japan as the supplier of consumer and capital goods rather than the UK because the UK had received an unfair preference on a greater value of goods from Pakistan and because Pakistan could secure easy markets and secondary industries elsewhere. Consequently in 1952, Japan was outselling the UK in the textile industry and Italy was replacing the UK as Pakistan’s chief supplier of cotton yarn. This sparked considerations amongst the British about whether the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should be renegotiated because it had prevented the UK and Pakistan from achieving equality in trading preferences. Therefore, Pakistan’s independent foreign policy decision-making forced the UK to reconsider its trade agreements. 

However, many former colonised countries have historically lacked the economic freedom of former colonisers, and so the argument can be made that they have to take advantage of more recent trading preferences. The UK was the third major country destination for exports from Pakistan in 2023, behind the US and China. Pakistan has benefitted from the UK’s Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS) since June 2023, and before that the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). DCTS gives preferential trade schemes to “developing” countries; Pakistan being one of 16 countries with enhanced preferences. Therefore, despite the country turning away from the UK shortly after independence due to unfair trade agreements, exporters in Pakistan are now entitled to 0% import tariffs on 92% of their product lines. But it should be noted that, if these preferences are being used to exert British influence over Pakistan, then it must be considered a form of neocolonialism.  

Independence in Foreign Policy-Making 

The British also controlled India’s foreign policy in the colonial era. Another aspect of decolonisation is thus independence in foreign policy decision-making. The British were concerned by the “anti-Colonialist” meeting hosted by Ceylon in April 1954 called the Colombo Conference, conducted with Pakistan, India, Burma and Indonesia. They condemned ongoing colonialism and hoped to resist domestic interference by both communist and anti-communist forces. They agreed to organise an expanded Asian-African conference at Bogor in December 1954, at which issues of national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism would be considered, becoming some of the central issues at the Bandung Conference of April 1955. British politician Creech Jones, in June 1955, described the denouncement of imperialism and colonialism as a “new political awareness in the world, which will not countenance any claim of superiority or the practise of racial discrimination.” For Jones, it was evidence of the need for the British to rid itself of discriminatory practices.  

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) would grow out of the Bandung Conference in 1961, due to the argument that the participating countries should not ally militarily with the superpowers of the US and USSR. Pakistan achieved full membership in the NAM in September 1979 at its 6th summit, after it had been aligned with the West against the USSR through the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO, 1955) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO, 1954). The initial post-independence period thus saw military and foreign policy alignments between the UK and Pakistan, despite Bandung and the NAM. Later, the cooperation between Pakistan and the US during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89) also had the potential to threaten its non-aligned status.  

In contrast to Jones, Harold Macmillan, while Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in December 1955, suggested that negative characterisations of British colonial projects functioned as “propaganda” and an “easy weapon in the hands of the Communists.” Macmillan noted a statement by the prime minister of Ceylon at the Bandung Conference about Soviet satellite states as another form of colonialism less discussed than Western colonialism. Indeed, the Conference denounced colonialism in all of its manifestations. But Macmillan attempted to emphasise the dangers of Soviet colonialism specifically, noting the former’s larger weapons supply and it being “uninhibited by conscience, public opinion or parliamentary control,” despite British colonial exploitation and oppression. 

It was in the context of communism that the British retained hopes that former colonies might align with the UK. In February 1951, members of the House of Lords had expressed hopes that countries like Pakistan and India might be “persuaded to take off our shoulders the current work of the cold war in some of the distant parts of the Empire.” In comparison with the British unilateral declaration that India was involved in the Second World War (1939–45), the hope that former colonised nations will throw themselves into addressing Europe-centred issues continues and has been challenged again in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with a non-aligned and independent position preferable to such countries who can critique, but also protect their interests.  

Pakistan’s initial position on the invasion is a good example of this, with former Prime Minister Imran Khan having been present in Moscow at the time of the invasion, though allegedly by coincidence. Khan later stated that he was there to discuss bilateral agreements, describing those with Russia and China as designed to benefit the impoverished people of Pakistan. Successive Pakistani governments have also pointed out the double standard between the West’s approach to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lack of self-determination in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. 

Conclusion 

It was not possible to discuss all aspects of decolonisation in the UK-Pakistan relationship, with others including the issues of greater parity, non-interference in domestic matters and Pakistan’s multilateral cooperation in holding the British and others to account, particularly with regards to “loss and damages” for climate catastrophes and reparative justice. I have also previously given recommendations on how the UK-Pakistan cultural relationship can be decolonised. But this brief survey seeks to show some key developments in the relationship between the UK and Pakistan through a decolonial lens, noting examples of decolonisation, but also of the survival of colonial legacies and approaches within this relationship.  

Dr Mary Hunter is a Director of Research at the Policy Research Institute for South Asia (PRISA), where she is focused on UK-South Asia relations. She has a PhD from the University of St Andrews, with a thesis on the Islamisation of Pakistan and its impact on religious minorities. Dr Hunter was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR) in Pakistan, where she produced a policy memo on ‘Decolonisation in UK-Pakistan Cultural Relations,’ and she regularly contributes articles to news outlets and think tanks on a variety of topics.

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