The interim government in Banagladesh faces many obstacles following the fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government. The two most significant are the patronage network of loyal government workers and India’s perceived lack of cooperation with the new government. 

It has been a month since the 16-year-long reign of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina came to an end following a student-led mass revolution in Bangladesh. On 5 August 2024, Hasina resigned and fled to India amid week-long protests. The public backlash initially started with the demand to address the long-standing issue of discriminatory access to government jobs, known as quotas, followed by the government’s brutal crackdown on them. The situation escalated to the point where the government deployed military forces, imposed a nationwide curfew, and authorised the use of lethal force against protesters. Within a week, at least 800 protesters, including middle and senior high schoolers, had been killed, and thousands more were injured. After the fall of the regime of the Bangladesh Awami League-AL (led by Sheikh Hasina), an interim government was formed under the Noble Peace Laureate Muhammad Yunus. With its diverse representation, including the students who led the movement, this interim government stands as a beacon of hope for a united Bangladesh.

While the revolution occurred over the span of just one month, these events represent the culmination of ongoing tensions across the 16 years of AL’s undemocratic rule and signify the usual pattern of authoritarian regimes rising and falling around the world.

 The Chatra League and government clientelism

A significant way of controlling politics in Bangladesh by the major political parties, including AL, BNP, and Jamaat Islami Bangladesh, is through their student wings, dedicated to fomenting street violence. Among these, the AL’s student wing, Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL), has gained notoriety for its violent activities. For instance, any opposition protests for free and fair elections have been violently suppressed by the BCL, often with support from the police. During the quota movement’s first protests in July 2024, Dhaka University students faced violence from BCL after the ruling party’s General Secretary, Obaidul Quader, declared that the BCL could handle anti-government protests.

Another way of exerting control on politics is through clientelism, incentivising supporters in almost every sector. The AL enjoyed the extreme outcome of clientelist politics, which it achieved over three consecutive terms. Over the sixteen years, without any visible accountability mechanism, the AL has established a powerful patronage system across various sectors, including the bureaucracy, police, army, judiciary, media, business groups, university professors, and civil society. Although the patronage system works distinctly under the umbrella of an informal network, they cooperate when the party needs it. For example, during the student-led quota protests, the BCL incited violence against the students with the tacit approval of the AL President and General Secretary, the Vice Chancellor, and key university officials, including a few professors, all working against the students in favor of the BCL. Following the initial violence, Hasina intervened after being prompted to do so by a journalist group within the network. When the initial action failed, the government used the judiciary. The final stage of the violent action was carried out jointly by the BCL, police officials, and other law enforcement agencies. After the violence, business groups, also part of the patronage system, assured the prime minister of their continued support for the government despite the mass movement.

AL patronage network-members enjoyed the most privileged position in society. They occupied key positions in the country’s primary political and economic institutions and had unrestricted access to money. The initial Quota movement was started by graduate students at the University of Dhaka preparing to enter the government job competition. They were angered by the understanding that AL’s practice of giving privileges to its student supporters would continue to manipulate the quota system. Despite the protest, AL appeared unwilling to compromise on recruiting its students in the bureaucracy and police.

Elections without voting

In 2017, the United States Institute of Peace’s RESOLVE Network conducted a survey in Bangladesh. The study found that Bangladeshis overwhelmingly supported (98 percent) democratic principles and institutions. The study also revealed that dissatisfaction with the Hasina regime drove citizens to seek alternatives to promote good governance and prevent corruption. However, the country’s citizens could not exercise voting rights in the last three general elections. The ruling AL party arranged all the previous three elections, confirming they would not face competitive voting. Bangladesh’s youth groups, aged 18 to 28, have never been able to vote in the national election to choose their representatives, including the country’s prime minister. Whereas 18-year-olds missed their first opportunity to vote in the recent 2024 election, younger individuals were also uncertain about when they would be able to cast their votes  if the AL regime continued. Public frustration, particularly among the younger generation, steadily grew.

Over the years, the suppression of student forces mounted as people were killed, injured, arrested, or simply disappeared. Other events across the years include the Hefazat movement in 2013, the first quota movement in 2018, the road safety movement in 2018, the movement against Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh in 2021, and the ongoing Boycott India movement that began right after the Bangladesh general election in 2024, which was boycotted by the major opposition parties due to India’s perceived support.

What Next? Reversing the Context

In the past 16 years, the AL has wielded every political, economic, and social institution in Bangladesh to sustain its regime. Virtually every sector in the country has felt its impact. Nonetheless, the interim government is duty-bound to transfer power to a democratic party through a fair election. Presently, the people of Bangladesh are unequivocally demanding that the Yunus-led government overhaul the institutions, particularly the judiciary, the election commission, the police, and the bureaucracy. However, the Yunus government faces significant hurdles, necessitating strategic and resolute action to surmount them. The government has initiated various reform measures, including establishing six new commissions tasked with reforming the following significant institutions: the electoral system, police, judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration, and the country’s constitution. However, the challenges it faces from different directions are also enormous.

Internally, the activists of AL and those employed in various institutions, who owe their loyalty to AL, have been affected. The police and judiciary are the two crucial institutions, for instance, that cannot be reformed overnight. Meanwhile, a significant portion of civil society and media also belong to AL’s support network, posing challenges for the interim government. Another significant barrier is India’s involvement. A significant number of Bangladeshis hold India accountable for its ongoing support for the Hasina regime, despite the regime’s non-democratic actions and adversarial stance toward opposition forces and citizens. Following Hasina’s downfall, several “counterrevolution” movements are believed to have been attempted against the interim government, and some student leaders directly or indirectly have pointed to possible Indian involvement in those attempts. Additionally, in the last week of August, extensive flooding affected over two million people in north-eastern Bangladesh, for which people pointed fingers at India for releasing water from its side without any warning. Finally, Hasina’s escape to India has put New Delhi in an awkward position, and the relationship between post-Hasina Bangladesh and India is strained. The extent to which this relationship will hinder the functioning of the interim government remains to be seen.

Harun Rashid is a PhD candidate and an adjunct professor of Political Science at Kent State University in the USA. The author can be reached via email at mrashid@kent.edu

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.