In recent years, mass protests have surged globally, from climate strikes to social justice demonstrations. Notably, the working class in CEE is far less engaged than its Western counterparts.

Significant disparities in protest behavior exist between Western Europe (WE) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2010-2018) reveals that protest participation rates in CEE are less than half of those in WE, with an average of only four percent of citizens engaging in protests. This disparity is particularly stark among the working class: less than three percent of post-socialist workers participate in protests, compared to around seven percent in WE. While the gap is narrower among the middle and upper classes, these figures highlight the distinct barriers that workers in CEE face, which significantly hinder their protest participation and widen the gap between them and their Western counterparts.

Why do post-socialist workers protest less? Key factors behind the class gap

The analysis of data from Eastern and Western Europe shows that the class gap in protest participation between Central Eastern and Western Europe is driven primarily by two factors: regional disparities in labour protection and political mobilisation.

Firstly, the economic transition in post-socialist countries has led to greater disparities in wealth and power, alongside increased economic dependency on the West. Following the collapse of socialism, many CEE countries underwent rapid privatisation and economic restructuring, often accompanied by significant cuts in public spending on labour markets. The decline in union power and the weakening of labour laws have left workers in a precarious position. Without strong labour protection, the risks associated with protest participation are significantly higher for post-socialist workers, who may fear job loss or other forms of retaliation. This contributes to the lower levels of protest participation observed in CEE, where the working class, despite facing severe economic challenges, remains largely disengaged from collective action.

Secondly, political mobilisation is a critical factor contributing to the class gap in protest participation. In many WE countries, left-wing parties and movements have historically played a crucial role in mobilising the working class for protests, with strong ties to trade unions and other civil society groups providing the resources and networks necessary for effective mobilisation. In contrast, the political landscape in CEE is marked by a lack of strong left-wing parties and a decline in union membership. The collapse of the socialist bloc led to a crisis of class identity, and many former communist parties shifted towards neoliberal policies, abandoning their traditional support for workers’ rights. As a result, the post-socialist working class is less likely to be mobilised by the left, further contributing to lower levels of protest participation.

Structural barriers to the empowerment of the working class in Central Eastern Europe

The prospects for enhancing the political voice of the working classes in post-socialist Europe are fraught with challenges. The demobilising effects of insufficient social safety nets and the erosion of left political identities are deeply rooted in the dependent nature of post-socialist economies. The peripheral position of CEE countries within global capitalism, combined with the complex outcomes of post-socialist transformation, has created a vicious cycle: political passivity among the working classes perpetuates poor labour conditions, and weak labour conditions further discourage political engagement.

For meaningful change, it is essential to provide state-backed safety nets and strengthen left mobilisation efforts. However, the weak representation of organised labour in these regions means that economic issues often go unchallenged, leaving socio-cultural concerns as the primary political battleground. Breaking free from this cycle of dependency requires transformative changes that extend beyond national or regional boundaries. The success of such efforts depends not only on the political will of local elites but also on the alignment of global capital interests. As long as capitalists in core states continue to benefit from a cheap and easily controlled labour force in the periphery, CEE countries will have strong incentives to maintain these labour conditions to attract foreign direct investment. Under these circumstances, the prospects for working-class mobilisation remain bleak.

Endangered democracy: The rise of right-wing populism

The political passivity of the post-socialist working class creates opportunities for populist parties. There is a growing tendency among workers in CEE countries to align with right-wing movements, as seen in the substantial working-class support for parties like Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in Poland and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary. More broadly, populist radical right parties across Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and other parts of the post-socialist region have effectively capitalised on long-standing socio-economic grievances and political exclusion to attract workers.

While Western Europe is also experiencing a rise in right-wing populism and a decline in left-wing mobilisation, the lack of left political mobilisation among workers in the post-socialist context exacerbates the problem, leaving a vacuum that the radical right fills. Although some populist radical right parties might offer short-term benefits to specific worker groups through social security measures, their policies typically exclude large segments of the population, and their rise to power often contributes to democratic backsliding, as seen in Poland and Hungary.

Addressing the underrepresentation of workers in protest participation in CEE necessitates a comprehensive strategy that takes into account the region’s historical, economic, and political intricacies. Without these complex transformations, the post-socialist working class is likely to remain marginalised, caught in a cycle of political disengagement and vulnerability to populist narratives. Ultimately, bridging this gap is not just about boosting protest numbers; it is about building a more inclusive and participatory democracy that authentically represents the voices of economically disadvantaged citizens.

This article is based on findings from my recent book, The Class Gap in Protest Participation: The Comparative Case of Central Eastern and Western Europe,

Dr Viktoriia Muliavka is a postdoctoral researcher of comparative public policy at the University of Bamberg. Her research focuses on class politics, welfare attitudes, political participation, and post-socialist transformations.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.