China’s unprecedented naval drills in the Tasman Sea signal a bold shift in its military strategy. Timed with US Indo-Pacific Commander Samuel J. Paparo’s visit to Canberra, this move tests regional security dynamics amid the Trump-Putin deal, challenging strategic stability.

Very few expected China’s naval presence to extend deep into the Tasman Sea, a region far beyond its traditional sphere of operations. Yet, on the day when Samuel J. Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command and a China hawk, travelled to Canberra, Beijing conducted live-fire drills in waters between Australia and New Zealand. This unprecedented military advancement has forced Australia and its allies into a reactive posture, scrambling to assess China’s intentions and associated implications. This military drill can be simply explained as a response to the US-led Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits. However, it is more about a deliberate test, an unmistakable display of Beijing’s growing confidence in power projection, and a calculated challenge to the strategic balance during the Trump-Putin deal. 

Beyond exerting pressure on Australia, these exercises also serve as a trial run for potential coercion against Taiwan. By conducting operations in distant waters, China is assessing the effectiveness of military manoeuvres as a tool of intimidation. From the view of China, this political test is a precursor to a bigger piece-by-piece strategy to see to what extent Australia would respond to it. If China perceived the responses from regional actors were acceptable, it could embolden Beijing to employ similar tactics in the Taiwan Strait—gradually escalating military activities, disrupting commercial routes, and testing the resolve of Taiwan’s allies. Trump’s isolationism has already horrified the US’ European allies. In reversing the US relationship with Ukraine, Trump has displayed his attitude towards the US allies and geopolitical tensions in Eurasia, including Taiwan. Therefore, in a more critical way, China will test the responses from the US and see if Trump’s approach in Ukraine also applies in Asia. 

In many ways, the Situations of Taiwan and Ukraine are similar. The Chinese military has consistently enhanced its capacity for blockade operations, air superiority, and amphibious landings. China is also testing its logistical capabilities and evaluating how far it can push the boundaries of its influence before triggering a significant international response. This time, by deploying warships beyond its usual sphere of operations. China’s strategic calculus concerning Taiwan is heavily influenced by external factors, especially the US’ evolving foreign policy posture. Trump’s retreat from the frontlines in Ukraine has created uncertainty about America’s future commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing may perceive this uncertainty as an opportunity to test how far it can push its military manoeuvres without provoking a robust response. 

Rather than doubting whether China’s military brinkmanship falls within international law or normal practice, what matters is the political signals China wants to convey. By deploying warships in close proximity to Australian waters and executing live-fire drills without prior warning, China is gauging Canberra’s capacity and willingness to respond to such provocations. This strategy aligns with Beijing’s broader effort to challenge US allies in the Indo-Pacific and ascertain their strategic resolve in the face of Chinese assertiveness. 

The nature of these exercises can thus be interpreted as a deliberate stress test: an assessment of how quickly and effectively Australia and its allies can coordinate responses to sudden military manoeuvres in their vicinity. This event should not be seen as the result of a single factor, such as a retaliatory move against US-led Freedom of Navigation operations in the South China Sea. Instead, it should be analysed within the broader geopolitical context following Trump’s diplomatic shift. 

China’s strategic thinkers are likely assessing whether prolonged and intense military pressure—without direct invasion—can achieve political and strategic objectives. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the severe consequences for both sides. The use of direct military invasion to alter geopolitical realities in Russia’s war in Ukraine has resulted in massive resistance, severe casualties, economic breakdown and international isolation. China is definitely interested in what is happening in Europe, highlighted by Xi’s call with Putin in January, withTaiwan listed as one of the talking points. In that call, Putin confirmed his unwavering support for Beijing’s ‘One China principle’, and Xi reiterated theinevitability of China’s reunification. 

One of the key takeaways from Ukraine, for China, is the West’s apprehension and hesitancy in direct military intervention and Ukraine’s war fatigue in a prolonged stalemate against a nuclear power. The delayed and piecemeal military assistance and waning attention regarding Ukraine’s dilemma have highlighted the constraints of collective security commitments when confronted with a determined and powerful adversary. China is likely to analyse these dynamics to determine whether sustained military posturing, coupled with economic coercion and information warfare, could gradually weaken Taiwanese resistance without necessitating an outright invasion. To date, China has routinised military drills around the island and conducted multiple flight practices over the middle line of the Strait.  

By executing naval exercises in the Tasman Sea, China is effectively simulating the kind of strategic pressure it could apply to Taiwan. Just as Australia and New Zealand were forced into reactive diplomatic and military responses, China may envision a scenario where Taiwan is subjected to relentless military manoeuvres, economic blockades, and disinformation warfare designed to erode its will. When Australia and other regional stakeholders can do nothing more than make diplomatic complaints, Beijing may conclude that similar tactics could be successful in the Taiwan Strait. 

In short, China’s fleet in the Tasman Sea can be viewed as a broader rehearsal for potential military operations against Taiwan. This intelligence-gathering operation is not a prelude to an imminent assault next Friday, but rather a strategic effort to cultivate long-term psychological readiness for both Chinese decision makers and outside observers.  

In a wider geopolitical perspective, the Chinese leadership has used this opportunity of strategic ambiguity resulting from Trump’s radical signals of foreign policy to accelerate its coercion against Taiwan. It is keenly aware of the economic and military vulnerabilities that an invasion of Taiwan would entail. A direct assault on Taiwan would likely provoke severe international backlash, including intensified economic sanctions and possible military intervention. In Beijing’s view, if the US allies are unwilling to act decisively in response to sustained pressure, it may opt for an incremental strategy—gradual economic strangulation, intensified military exercises, and cyber warfare—to isolate Taiwan over time. 

For Australia, China’s naval activities demonstrate a potential routinisation of China’s military exercises in the near waters. How to respond to more Chinese naval deployments without giving up the commitment to the rule-based order and escalating the situation is an immediate challenge. Australia faces a significant long-term issue is enhancing naval capabilities and improving the ability to monitor foreign warships in the region. 

For Taiwan, the implications of these drills are clear. If China perceives that coercive tactics can achieve strategic objectives without triggering decisive intervention, it may increasingly apply similar strategies in the Taiwan Strait. The West’s response—or lack thereof—to these provocations and increasing American isolationism will shape Beijing’s calculations in the coming years. This will not be the last time when China’s navy shows up in the Tasman Sea for military purposes. Again, it is a stress test, but it also serves as a warning—one that Australia, the US, and Taiwan cannot afford to ignore. 

Dr Guangyi Pan, is a lecturer in International Political Studies at UNSW Canberra 

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.