Competing development models in the Indo-Pacific highlight tensions between US-led openness and China’s revisionist socialism. Their impact on regional stability and the potential for cooperation through shared goals like sustainability and human security is all encompassing, higlighting the need to rethink state-to-state relations.

China’s increasing military capacity and stated intent and behavior, combined with the imminent change of US president warrant an inquiry into methods that may avoid conflict. A development approach may be used to explore the sources and seek solutions. Presently, each state is following a different development model—a framework or strategy that guides economic, social, and political growth, aiming to improve well-being through policies and practices.

Conceptually, global development may be employed by the great powers to build a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific during the completion of the current demographic transition. Arguably, the central concern for global development is the carrying capacity of the planet, as population has grown rapidly from approximately 1 billion in the 1700s, and is predicted to surpass 10 billion by the 2080s. Demographic transition theory accounts for this change, describing how populations shift from high birth and death rates to low rates as societies industrialise. Hence the success of the capitalist development model improved healthcare and other social outcomes and societies modernised.

The communication and information dynamics that contributed to the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–53) between China and the US more than likely still exist in the Indo-Pacific region. Conflict over development models provided the rationale for the Korean War, when reduced to its most basic disagreements, and continues to shape ongoing development-based conflicts today. The most recognizable in the present are civilizational and or religious that result in economic disparities and resource competition, such as in Sudan, or calls for changes to the system of government, such as the Arab Spring protests in Syria.

The initiation of violent conflict can be attributed to different actors’ perceptions at various levels. For instance, in the 1950s, the US aimed to contain the Soviet Union globally through NSC 68, particularly on the Korean peninsula; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was focused on completing its civil war, bombarding Taiwan, and establishing the Pepole’s Republic of China (PRC); and North and South Korea had their own domestic agendas. Each actor followed a rational process based on the information they held and their ability to communicate. The ensuing conflict resulted from an inability to compromise and form a broad, agreed-upon development model. Similarly, Russia, North Korea, and the PRC, in the present, are perceived as future threats to US-led global development.

Messaging, information, and communication problems in the contemporary Indo-Pacific do not have the rigid ideological contrasts of the mid-twentieth century. However, significant differences in interpreting roles, interests, and events still guide the actions and interests of actors today, as in the 1950s. The PRC pursues revisionist socialism with Chinese characteristics—described by the EU as “…interventionist industrial policies and a broad array of other tools to pursue political and economic objectives set by the Party”—while the US maintains a free and open Indo-Pacific agenda—long-term democratic resilience through rules-based capacity-building. In addition, legacy issues, like the divided Korean Peninsula and the PRC’s intent to reunify with Taiwan, remain in the present, stable yet unresolved, continuing to affect the political economy and serve as narratives of revisionism in domestic politics and public diplomacy. Thus, the conflict over determining one’s form of development still exists.

Regionally, the different development models are increasingly in conflict, exemplified by the nine-dash line versus UNCLOS conflict in the South China Sea, and a symptom of the ideological clash aimed at setting the system’s rules. The CCP’s claimed sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the South China Sea were, according to PRC sources, established through imperial power and maritime hegemony dating back 2,000 years to the Han Dynasty. Globalisation since the 1950s, driven by US-led institutional hegemony through the Bretton Woods institutions, has arguably fostered greater alignment of actors’ interests and a more stable political economy.

A potentially significant new driver of competition is also the ongoing demographic transition. Many differences in envisioned development stem from historical narratives and are used by actors in the contemporary political economy to gain power for future growth. For example, overcoming the hundred years of humiliation is the CCP’s powerful narrative that enthralls the Chinese people into submission to rejuvenate the nation. Pursuing power to impose development ideals through conflict-based narratives in an increasingly crowded, resource-scarce political economy may lead to more conflict, inefficiency, instability, and reduced human security.

Focusing on prospects for human security and development, the PRC and the US could emphasize expressing a common vision or narrative focusing on future cooperative benefits. This could stem from responses to the United Nations warnings about rapid population growth and the need to achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, validated by actions at domestic and global levels to gain power through providing global political and economic public goods. Subsequently, utilizing other actors at different levels by gaining consent and collaboration may help sustain and expand the regional political economy.

This may engender active and practical compromise to resolve disputes through institutionalised, transparent processes. The Indo-Pacific society of nations could develop through agreed and expanding free flows of people and ideas and the creation of common norms. Empathy can be fostered through people-to-people interaction and a structural functionalism approach, such as joint research and publications, staff exchanges and career opportunities, tourism, common business interests, and investments that help build mutual interests. It leads to a broad approach with low expectations over extended periods, adaptable to individual change yet guided by a common vision and the structural power of a global development narrative, norms, and institutions. This approach mirrors the success of liberal institutionalism after World War II, but it is aimed at tackling a shared future challenge rather than rebuilding after a war.

Humanity’s development future is inherently singular. The rapid population growth associated with a demographic transition is a temporary phenomenon that began during the Industrial Revolution in 1780. This process of continual change will only stabilize in the early 22nd century when the global population once again reaches equilibrium. What this means for humanity is unknown, but a practical subject to research. Hypothetically, when this transition is completed, humanity’s ability to establish a stable-population political economy may be possible. Thus, managing change toward that stable future should be prioritised rather than employing history or legacy-stalemated issues within the competition for power to pursue the unique development ideals of exclusive revisionist socialism with Chinese characteristics, or a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Significant domestic political and economic differences between the US and PRC, particularly in political systems and human rights, may lead to conflict. However, these differences are not insurmountable structural barriers. The timing differences in industrial revolutions between Europe, the US, and Asia are arguably the central cause. The PRC is a comparatively young political economy lacking the breadth of experience to check its impulses for its own benefit. Deng Xiaoping’s check on leadership—the creation of two-term and age limits—and their removal by Xi Jinping is emblematic of the common impulse of societies to manage rogue leaders, and underscores how personal frailty leads to conflict. While the human rights of Tibetans and other groups in the PRC are paramount to the concept of Human Security, they may best be obtained through development collaboration with the PRC in a purposeful, transparent manner rather than through conflict.

History shows that human empathy has limits, and conflicts arise. The threat (not necessarily the use) of violence forces those bent on self-aggrandisement to be subjected to the will of many. It enables seeking self-interests through legitimate, free, non-violent competition without the need to be repeatedly drawn back to increasingly well-armed battlefields that risk destruction. From a development perspective, US and PRC public diplomacy may either focus on human security for eight billion people facing scarcity, or on historical and contemporary differences in a power struggle over which development model to implement, risking conflict with a common loss.

Jonathan Ping is an associate professor of political economy at Bond University and the director of the East Asia Security Centre @DrJHPing

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.