Donald Trump’s neglect of Southeast Asia, coupled with controversial foreign policy decisions like his Gaza proposal and the abolishment of USAID, is eroding US credibility and trust in the region. As ASEAN states seek alternative partnerships with middle powers and China capitalises on Washington’s missteps, America risks losing its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific

Only a few weeks back into the White House, it seems that Donald Trump has already lost credibility and trust in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in keeping with trends from his first administration, Trump has shown no interest in Southeast Asia. Without China, the region will most likely not get any attention now in Washington. But how does this impact the geopolitical dynamic in the region and US interests, such as in the South China Sea? 

During the Senate confirmation hearing of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth there was a viral funny moment where Senator Tammy Duckworth asked if he could name the importance of at least one ASEAN country and what type of agreement the US has with it. Quite shockingly, Hegseth could not even name one ASEAN country. This clearly shows that Southeast Asia will not be in his priority as a defence secretary. This is quite ironic since one of the most important security interests for the United States has been to secure peace and security in the South China Sea as an important navigation route for global commerce. The region is not only important for US economic and security interests, but also increasingly as an area for US contestation with China. 

In the latest 2024 ISEAS State of Southeast Asia survey, perceptions of the US as an influential economic power in the region were already far behind China at 14 percent (with China at 60 percent). However, the region still sees the US as an important country and as a partner in maintaining a rules-based international order. This perception sits at 29.9 percent approval, the highest compared to all other states, including China at only 11.5 percent.  

For some, however, this perception is likely to change too. International legal scholar Donald Rothwell, for instance, has argued that Trump’s proposal to relocate Palestinians and take over the Gaza Strip has crossed a red line in international law. Though Trump’s rhetoric may be just bluster, it is likely to increase Southeast Asia’s distrust towards Washington. The ISEAS survey last year shows that the impact of the Israel-Hamas conflict has contributed to a growing trust deficit, with perceptions of international law and the US-led rules-based order hovering at only 27.5 percent.   

Trump’s Gaza proposal, which would violate international law, will certainly damage US leadership and reinforce its image as a violator of international law. Indonesia and Malaysia have strongly rejected this proposal, though one must note that these two countries do not diplomatically recognise Israel, and are highly prejudiced against that nation. Favourability towards the US among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, the three majority Muslim countries in ASEAN, is likely to suffer further if such rhetoric is carried through to policy. Traditionally, for countries like Indonesia, public perception towards the US has long been influenced by the nature of American involvement in the affairs of Muslim countries. 

Interestingly, these negative sentiments towards Trump’s Gaza proposal have created sympathy from China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman has responded by noting that they “all along believed that ‘Palestinians governing Palestine’ is the fundamental principle of post-conflict governance of Gaza,” and “We [China] oppose the forced displacement of the people in Gaza.” China’s response, to be sure, is likely to garner more sympathy from Southeast Asian countries.  

Another recent event that will also hurt US soft power in the region is the recent abolishment of USAID, a program which served as a key element of US engagement in the region through assistance and collaborative projects. For the past few years, USAID has provided technical assistance to ASEAN’s Sectoral Working Groups and the ASEAN Secretariat to promote regional cooperation in areas such as human rights, transnational crime, disaster preparedness and management, and trade facilitation. These programs have not only increased capacity but also built trust in the US. With this declining role, the US may lose its soft power in the region, which may create a vacuum. 

With uncertainty running high under President Trump about America’s intentions, and the ASEAN tendency to not choose sides between the US and China, some Southeast Asian countries have sought to expand and diversify cooperation. For instance, this year, Indonesia became the first ASEAN state to become a full member of BRICS, with Thailand also recently becoming a partner. While joining BRICS has created a debate domestically in Indonesia, this may reiterate Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy while maintaining its strategic ambiguity. This absence of American leadership will force Southeast Asian countries to seek greater partnership with middle powers such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 

Indeed, Trump has not yet produced a clear policy or strategy for Southeast Asia. However, it should be noted that his foreign policy decisions and proposals for the Middle East and Gaza may also impact how Southeast Asia views the US. To maintain America’s leadership role and trust in the region, Trump needs to have a strategy to engage with the region and the broader Indo-Pacific. This will be especially vital to ensuring US leadership in maintaining peace and security, such as in the South China Sea.  

Aristyo Rizka Darmawan is lecturer in International Law at Universitas Indonesia and a PhD Scholar at the Australian National University.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.