As the Gaza conflict’s repercussions spread, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent remarks at a party meeting in Rize and an event in Kocaeli have drawn significant attention. Beyond domestic political rhetoric, however, Türkiye’s options favour a more pragmatic ceasfire. 

During a meeting of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, “If (we) get stronger, Israel cannot do what it is doing in Palestine now. Just like [when] we entered Karabakh, just like [when] we entered Libya, we might do [something] similar to them. There is no reason why we cannot do this. We must be strong so that we can take these steps.”

In Kocaeli, Erdogan said, “The only step that will stop Israeli arrogance, Israeli banditry and Israeli state terrorism is the alliance of Islamic countries.”

Accordingly, some media speculated that Türkiye might take military action against Israel. However, Erdogan’s comments seem to be more about appealing to domestic conservative voters and expressing disappointment to the West and Israel rather than signalling actual military intervention.

Military intervention: Reality or rhetoric?

His first speech can be interpreted in various ways and does not necessarily indicate direct military action. The phrase “we might do [something] similar to them” could imply a range of non-military actions, such as providing weapons, military training, or economic support to Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Türkiye’s previous involvement in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, did not involve deploying its troops directly.

If military intervention occurs, it is more likely to involve proxies or pro-Turkish Sunni groups rather than Turkish troops. Türkiye currently lacks the political will to escalate its involvement, despite increasing domestic support for Palestinians. Additionally, the risks associated with direct participation—such as international backlash and economic consequences—far outweigh the potential benefits. Hence, Erdogan’s references to Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, rather than Türkiye’s current military actions in Syria or Iraq, indicate that there are no concrete plans for intervention. These pronouncements, therefore, are likely more for his conservative voters who see Palestine as a core issue.

Examining domestic political landscape in Türkiye is pivotal for understanding how foreign policy is currently shaped toward Israel. Erdogan’s party’s loss in the March local elections can be partly attributed to his ambiguous stance during the Israel-Palestine conflict, which weakened support among conservative voters. Before the elections, Erdogan avoided commenting extensively on Israel’s actions in Gaza, fearing damage to Türkiye’s economic ties with Israel and ongoing diplomatic efforts. This cautious stance led to backlash from his religiously conservative base.

Conversely, Erdogan was also aware that adopting an overly pro-Palestinian stance in rhetoric and policy, or even breaking off relations with Israel and engaging in military intervention, could further isolate Türkiye internationally. This explains his more moderate but ambiguous stance, which ultimately dissatisfied many domestic factions.

While the Turkish stance towards the Israel-Palestinian conflict has a high approval rate, Conservative voters felt that Erdogan prioritised economic ties with Israel over solidarity with the Palestinians, leading some to support opposition candidates in the elections.

With constitutional reforms and future general elections at stake, Erdogan has since adjusted his rhetoric, severing some commercial ties with Israel, submitting a bid to join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and delivering provocative speeches to appease his conservative voters (like what he said in Kocaeli).

However, these moves may be more about pressuring Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire with Hamas than a permanent break in relations. Türkiye has allowed its ally Azerbaijan to continue exporting crude oil to Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Trade has granted companies a three-month grace period to fulfil their export-ban orders and continue trading with Israel through third countries. This flexibility suggests that Türkiye might reverse its position if the Israeli government changes or if a ceasefire is reached.

Türkiye and Israel: Navigating strategic cooperation amid tensions

As evident, Türkiye still believes that a truce is the only way to benefit Türkiye, the ruling coalition, and Erdogan himself by avoiding facing predicaments both domestically and internationally.

Despite tensions, Türkiye views Israel as a critical partner. Their cooperation, especially in intelligence-sharing and regional security, dates back to the 1990s. Concerns over Iran’s growing influence and its support for non-state actors, such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels, have driven Türkiye and Israel to maintain their strategic relationship. For Türkiye, Israel’s support is also vital in countering the PKK and Kurdish militias while advancing military modernisation efforts.

Additionally, economic and energy cooperation remains another crucial area of mutual interest. The Eastern Mediterranean’s energy resources offer opportunities for collaboration, with both countries working on infrastructure to export natural gas to Europe. Before the Gaza conflict, they had agreed to increase bilateral trade, focusing on joint energy exploration in the region. As Türkiye aspires to become a regional energy hub, Israel’s cooperation and support are crucial, especially given Athens’ similar ambitions and its efforts to court Israel as a partner in developing energy infrastructure, linking Israeli gas fields to Europe via Greece.

More importantly, Türkiye recognises that it has exhausted almost all available tools to persuade or pressure Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire and halting its military campaign in Gaza. Despite its diplomatic efforts and strong rhetoric, Türkiye’s influence over Israel remains limited, particularly given local geopolitical complications and Israel’s steadfast security concerns. This realisation compels Türkiye to adopt a more pragmatic yet cautious approach by relying on mediation led by Egypt, Qatar, and the US while urging its NATO counterparts to continue pressuring and lobbying Israel.

Now, Türkiye is unlikely to make significant shifts in its foreign policy toward Israel. Erdogan might contemplate imposing a stricter trade ban that closes existing loopholes, blocking NATO’s cooperation with Israel, closing Turkish airspace to flights to and from Israel, re-sheltering Hamas leaders with strict limitations to prevent interference in domestic politics, and pressuring Azerbaijan to reduce its crude oil exports to Israel if Israel refuses the ceasefire proposal.

However, such stricter measures are unlikely, given the potential for a harsh response from the US and resistance from allies like Qatar and Azerbaijan, especially when Qatar is striving to mediate the conflict and Azerbaijan is adopting a more favourable approach to Israel.

Looking ahead, normalising relations between Türkiye and Israel remains a possibility, primarily due to external influences from key allies like Azerbaijan and the US, who have vested interests in maintaining stability and cooperation in the region. Azerbaijan, in particular, envisions a trilateral pact with Israel and Türkiye and has played a crucial role in rebuilding Türkiye-Israel relations in the past.

Yet, a crucial question remains: Will this partnership serve Palestinian interests and satisfy Erdogan’s conservative base? The answer shapes Türkiye-Israel relations.

Cheuk Yui (Thomas) Kwong is a columnist for The News Lens Media and a political analyst at the Hong Kong Thinkers Company Limited. He was a research assistant at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He holds an advanced master’s degree in Middle East and Central Asian Studies from the Australian National University. For more information, you can contact him at https://linktr.ee/k_cyui.  

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.